

Executive Registry

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Dear Allen:

STAT

The attached 1-page memo which I've sent Premier Debré - an old friend - outlines quickly why I think the Berlin danger makes it urgent the Convention to explore Atlantic Union be called this year. I hope you find it worth your crowded time. I also attach my editorial on Debré in our forthcoming February magazine - and a reprint of my January one.

I have known Premier Debré since 1946 when he came to call on me here, saying he had read Union Now during the war and strongly favored Atlantic Union. He has confirmed his belief in it - which results from much individual thought - every time I've seen him since, the latest being last July.

I may be going to Paris soon to see him and others. I would esteem it a high privilege to have a talk with you beforehand. Much has happened since the last one.

Senator Humphrey has told us that he is going to reintroduce the Atlantic Convention resolution - and fight hard for it.

I shall give your office a ring in the hope you may find a little time for me. With highest regards,
Clarence

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1. Berlin and German problems . . their urgency . . the great risks in opening and maintaining a land corridor . . worse risk in abandoning Berlin, or seeming weak.
2. Present relative weakness of Atlantic community - in both conventional and latest arms - in will-power in Britain, which is likely to grow still weaker until coming election, and may worsen thereafter - in leadership in Washington, which lagged in bold imagination even before last election - in over-dependence on aging Adenauer in Bonn (with which Mr. K told Lippmann he felt he could eventually make another Stalin-Hitler deal) - the time needed to change such weaknesses into great strength.
3. The need to turn the tide quickly - but without increasing inflationary danger . . the fact that only realistic hope of achieving this is to supplement all present answers with a powerful new politico-moral move.
4. Calling proposed conference to explore Atlantic Union gives needed power quickly, plus immensely greater material power later, without inflationary danger . . Kremlin makes fetish of unity, fears this most in West but believes capitalistic nations incapable of real union, banks on our divisions to give it world rule, hence nothing could impress it more than decision to try to form Atlantic Union - this would also disconcert Moscow as disproving basic Marxist assumption that capitalistic nations must inevitably cut each other's throats in struggle for markets and profits.
5. Atlantic community's greatest untapped resource is union's proverbial strength . . Moscow knows it cannot compete once we harness this resource for it has already extracted all the strength it can from unity, whereas we have hardly begun to, and can gain far more since the free have vaster resources in men, knowhow & materials to unite.
6. Essential to take Kremlin by surprise if we are to gain enough strength quickly to turn tide (and not merely another corner) . . surprise gives much added force . . calling proposed conference would surprise everyone - world now assumes Atlantic Union is as remote as it assumed Sputnik was until it soared into orbit . . to see us begin to explore Atlantic Union this year would astonish world more than to see Moscow begin exploring space with manned rocket.
7. Only a move that astonishes the West itself as this would can surprise the Kremlin enough to turn the tide . . we not only throw them off balance but strengthen ourselves by proving we can do far more than most of us now assume we dare even to attempt.
8. Atlantic Union move, unlike others, is no mere stopgap, provides new framework for Berlin, German, other problems in which we can tackle them much more hopefully - opens for West such now unthoughtof vistas that Moscow would be forced to reconsider all its policies - could not continue tough line without thereby directly speeding Atlantic Union and thus defeating its own major end.
9. Result: Moscow would most probably switch back to conciliatory policy in hope of gaining time and removing incentive for us to unite (as when it withdrew from Austria after NATO grew stronger by uniting with Bonn) - first fruit might well be cessation of its present Berlin-Germany pressure, as it ceased Berlin blockade in 1948 once this led the West to move toward unity by alliance.

-- Clarence Streit

The Ontario, Washington 9 D.C.

Jan. 24, 1959 **Approved For Release 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000300080157-2**

PREMIER MICHEL DEBRÉ [REDACTED]

Michel Debré seems almost as misjudged now in the American and British press as General de Gaulle was when he came to power last year. The new French Premier has been presented as the General's Man Friday, and as a narrow nationalist, if not chauvinist. Certainly he is completely loyal to his chief. And certainly as long as the U.S. and Britain play their hands according to the rules of national sovereignty, he will fight fire with fire. Having known him personally since 1946 I have some basis, however, for testifying that he is no mere yes-man nor is he at heart a nationalist.

Premier Debré is a brilliant, far-sighted statesman in his own right. He has studied world affairs long and penetratingly. His range is broad - much wider than one might think from his decisive, determined manner. He is one of those rare lawyers who, like Justice Owen J. Roberts, are more drawn to Law's basic, constitutional than operational side. To his theoretical knowledge of federation - which he began exploring during the war as the way to peace -- he has recently added invaluable experience gained in working out the problem of union in the widely dispersed and varied "French Community," as chief drafter of its new Constitution.

Premier Debré gained his name as a nationalist because of his intransigent opposition to European Union and the European Defense Community. But this opposition resulted from the fact that he is Atlantic-minded rather than nationalistic. Long before EDC was dreamed of, or European Union was a practical issue, he had worked out his reasons for believing that the continental basis for international organization endangers peace and that the ocean offers a far better framework - particularly the North Atlantic ocean. To him the North Atlantic has long been "the modern Mediterranean" - the core of western civilization around which the new Rome of Liberty must be organized, and not on either continental shore alone.

Before he entered the de Gaulle Cabinet last year as Minister of Justice, Michel Debré as a Senator was vice president of the French Movement for Atlantic Union. He was one of the original signers of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity in 1954 (see October 1954 Freedom & Union for text and list of signers). He is the first member of the Atlantic Union Movement to attain his high office, though others have favored its objectives. He must, of course, deal with the practical political realities he faces, and one can be sure he will follow President de Gaulle's policy loyally in regard to Atlantic Union. One must wait to see what this will be. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that in a message to Freedom & Union on its fifth anniversary in 1951 Michel Debré wrote:

"A new force whose material power, political determination, and social attraction no one has a right to underestimate threatens liberty. The people of the U.S., Great Britain and France and other free peoples are staking their destiny in the coming years, and while some in the New World may still hesitate, those who live in the Old World can entertain a doubt only by remaining deaf and blind. However, there is no question that if they know how to unite their thoughts and political actions in all the important fields, the Western countries may not only live on but also restore to liberal civilization the appeal it has lost. The task is urgent and every delay makes war more probable and more imminent."

All the delay since these words were written eight years ago has served to confirm their wisdom, and make the task of uniting the Atlantic Community only the more urgent. And now their author is in a key position to assure to his beloved country and chief the honor of leading in this great undertaking - and to his own creative mind a further personal satisfaction. Now he himself can be a Founder of the new and far freer Rome around "the modern Mediterranean" he dreamed of through the dark years when he fought to liberate France from the Nazi nightmare.

Freedom & Union

MAGAZINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC WORLD

**Is NATO Keeping Up
With Rapidly Changing World?**

By PAUL-HENRI SPAAK, P. 14

**Cultural Exchange—a Way
to International Understanding**

By JOHN L. BROWN P. 20

EDITOR, CLARENCE STREET



**COMMUNISM IS BEATING
OUR UNBEATABLE HAND -
BECAUSE WE DON'T BET ON IT**

JANUARY 1959

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Freedom & Union

"For the Great Republic, for the Principle it Lives by and Keeps Alive, for Man's Vast Future."—LINCOLN.

Vol. 14, No. 1



January, 1959

FREEDOM & UNION'S POLICY

To think, write and act always in terms of all the democratic world, and not of any one country in it.

To mean by "we" (except editorially) the citizens of the coming Atlantic Union or Federation of All the Free, not merely those of any existing democracy.

To speed its coming by helping its people understand better the principles of individual freedom and federal union, and their importance to peace, production, higher living standards and greater spiritual growth and happiness.

To advance it also by helping the people of this Free Atlantic Community to see that they do form a community which they need to govern democratically.

To provide a forum for all views in the vast field of freedom and federation.

To bring out the facts in this field by objective, imaginative research.

To favor calling now a federal constitutional convention, representing the experienced civil liberty democracies, to work out and submit to their people a plan for uniting them in a Federal Union of the Free, or United States of the Atlantic, under a Constitution that would: 1) guarantee their Bill of Rights; 2) give them a free government in those fields where they agreed this would best advance individual freedom; 3) provide that this government shall be elected by, be responsible to, and operate on, the citizens and be federally balanced in its representation of them; 4) secure the right of each nation in the Union to continue to govern all its national affairs in complete independence.

To seek to extend the Union's free federal relationship to other nations peacefully and as rapidly as this will advance liberty and peace until eventually it grows into a free federal world republic.

To assure that, pending universality, this union shall be a loyal member of the United Nations.

[[On Second Thought]]

How Communism is Beating Freedom's Royal Flush

AS THE ADMINISTRATION and the new Congress face an increasingly grave tangle of problems, Mr. Khrushchev has obligingly clarified the basic issue, and therefore the answer. He did this through the very illuminating reports which Adlai Stevenson and Walter Lippmann gave of their recent visits to the U.S.S.R. These have had wide publicity, yet the major conclusion to be drawn from them seems to have been lost sight of.

"Overtake America," Governor Stevenson reports, is Soviet Russia's current "slogan." "You see it," he wrote in *The New York Times* after his Russian tour, "on huge red signs in factory yards, even on posters in children's playgrounds. This concentration on development and production is something to behold. By 'overtaking' America they mean matching America in per capita production. The seven-year plan just announced promises the Russians the highest living standard in the world by 1970 or before."

Lippmann's Interview with K. Here are some excerpts from Walter Lippmann's report in the *New York Herald-Tribune* Nov. 11 on his interview with Mr. Khrushchev:

"What, then, makes him think that the NATO powers might attack the Soviet Union? His answer, if I may put it in my own words, is that if the U. S. finds that it is going to lose the cold war, it is likely to resort to a hot war."

"He said rather solemnly, 'we'—the Communists—will cause you, the Americans, more 'trouble' each year. How? The trouble for the West will come

from the continual 'multiplication of benefits' received by the people of the Soviet states. At present, he said, the U. S. is the richest and most productive country in the world. But it is living 'the last years of its greatness.' Why? Because shortly the U.S.S.R. will surpass the U. S. in productivity per capita. He was referring, it was evident, to the coming seven-year plan. When that plan is achieved, the people (of the poor countries) will 'be convinced by their stomachs.' That is your danger, he asserted, not our hydrogen bomb.

"Here lies the answer to the question of why he thinks we might make war against him. It is an article of his faith, which descends from Lenin, that if the Soviet Union forges ahead in technology and productivity, attracting into its orbit the old colonial territory of the European empires, the West will attack.

New Russo-German Deal? On Nov. 10 Mr. Lippmann wrote:

"Americans, he [Mr. K.] began, seemed not to realize the danger which their present policy of rearming Germany may well bring down upon them. . . . that if a new war is unleashed . . . Germany might once again turn to the East against the West. Why? Because if Western Germany engaged in a war against the East, the U.S.S.R. could quickly destroy Western Germany—with its missiles. But if the Soviet Union encouraged Germany to turn against the West, the Germans alone will be much stronger than England, France and Spain combined. . . . The point of Mr. K's historical explanation [of Munich] was that another German-Soviet pact was at least as possible today as in

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1939—indeed, more probable, since a German attack on the Soviet Union had now become 'suicidal.' ”

Mr. K's Hope—and Fear. The Stevenson and Lippmann reports leave no doubt that: 1) the Khrushchev policy is aimed—and how confidently!—at surpassing the U. S. in production and standard of living by 1970, if not sooner; 2) the only serious danger of war lies in Mr. K's conviction that when Communism does near this goal, the U. S. will resort to war to prevent its peaceful victory, and 3) Mr. K. is very hopeful of winning anyway by making a deal with West Germany such as Stalin made with Hitler—intimidating it with intermediate missiles, rather than intimidating the U. S. directly.

Crafty Mr. K. Mr. K. is clearly and craftily seeking to isolate the U. S. by making the future turn on Communism's ability to surpass productively not Freedom but only one free people, the U. S. This puts the race in terms that Communism can hope to win.

Obvious but Overlooked Answer. The answer to Mr. K. is as obvious as it is neglected: It is to federate the free Atlantic Community. Only Atlantic Union can make indisputably clear that the race is not between Communism and one free country but between Communism and Freedom. More important, only Atlantic Union can quickly and decisively win the race—and thereby end the only danger of war Mr. K. sees.

Freedom's existing power, if federated politically and economically, would be so much greater than that of the U. S. alone that Mr. K. could no longer hope to surpass it by 1970 or 2000. Moreover, in that period federation would immensely stimulate the growth of Freedom's power in every field—not only in per capita production and standard of living, but on the political, military, scientific, educational and moral sides. These factors are so inter-related that, when combined the Federal Union way, their power becomes immensely greater than by any other combination of them. Federation raises their power as a straight flush does that of five cards.

Freedom's Royal Flush. An ace, king, queen, jack and 10 look strong but, if they belong to different suits, the hand

can be beaten several ways in poker. If, however, all five cards belong to the same suit, this one change, which seems so slight, makes the hand not merely 255 times stronger but an unbeatable royal flush. Similarly, when Freedom's power is no longer divided among different sovereign nations but united in one Atlantic Federal Union, its hand will become unbeatable. And Mr. K's hope of defeating Freedom by defeating only one free people will boomerang, and the war danger he fears, will end.

U.S.A. and U.S.F. An Atlantic Union might be called the United States of Atlantica. If so, Mr. K. would then be facing still the U.S.A.—but a U.S.A. he could not even dream of overtaking. For the U. S. of Atlantica would be based on the same federal principles that made its largest State, the U. S. of America, so free and strong. It might be better, however, to call this "more perfect Union" the United States of Freedom. That would keep the issue clearer, the contrast sharper between the two ways of life, the two means of producing—and it would also prove that the new Union's door was open to people of every region, religion and race who followed Freedom.

There is no geographic term in the name of the Union which Mr. K. expects to win the adherence of Asia and Africa by proving that Communism can out-produce America. We often call it Russia, but nothing in its real name limits it to any region or race; it embraces any people anywhere who embrace the Red "religion." The initials U.S.S.R. stand for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Only when it faces the U.S.F.—the United States of Freedom—will the issue be so clear that Mr. K's strategy for gaining all the world will fail completely.

The German Danger. Among the present hopes of Moscow which Atlantic Union would end is Mr. K's scheme for intimidating Western Germany into making a deal with Moscow as Hitler did. So long as the German Federal Republic remains—like all the NATO members—a sovereign ally, Moscow is bound to be encouraged by this hope . . . and tempted into such dangerous games as its present Berlin one. But once Western Germany—which includes West Berlin—is a State in the United

States of Freedom, this hope and the resulting perils will be gone. Moscow then could no more dream of detaching Berlin and Western Germany than of separating Texas from the United States of America now. Instead, it would be on the defensive, with no effective means of countering the powerful magnetic pull of the U. S. of Freedom on East Berlin and East Germany—to say nothing of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, all East Europe.

Safe German Unification. Thanks to Stalin's machiavellic "peace-making"—whereby much of Germany was given to Poland and many Germans were also driven from Czechoslovakia—and to previous German oppression of the Poles and Czechs, these peoples are bound to be drawn closer to Moscow by any reunification of Germany, whether achieved by free elections or by Mr. K's proposed confederation. There is one exception. The one way to re-unite Germany that would not have this effect would be for Germany to become a member of a Federal Union that included France, Britain, Western Europe and the U. S. A. Then the revival of German power, which the Poles and Czechs fear, whether national or in a German-dominated European Union, could no longer occur. Instead they would be drawn to seek entry themselves in this Union of the Free.

The Poles and Czechs would be attracted to the Union of the Free by many things—apart from the superior productive power which Mr. K. rates so high. Two of this Union's attractions for them are especially relevant now: 1) Since West Germany would enter the Union before East Germany did, they would probably remain two States within it. By its federal character, the U. S. F. would give the Germans all the advantages of unification—such as North and South Carolina enjoy in the U. S. A.—with none of the disadvantages which people in both West and East Germany now foresee. 2) All fear of war among the Poles, Czechs and Germans over such questions as Silesia and Sudetenland would be removed when the Poles and Czechs entered the U. S. F. too. Here too, only union can solve the issue.

Would Moscow Attack? Mr. K. reasons that the U. S. would resort to

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war rather than let Communism overtake it in productive power. By similar logic, would there not be serious danger that Moscow would attack if the free by federating ended its dreams of winning Asia, Africa, Germany? No.

The Communists draw their logic from Lenin, and his authority would favor a waiting game, lessening tension and making concessions with a view to breaking up the nascent Union by removing incentive to unite and encouraging "capitalist greed for markets" and other Marxist stand-bys to run free.

In the 20s and 30s, when Moscow had no hope of overtaking the U. S., its extreme weakness did not lead it to resort to aggression. But what of the possibilities of surprise attack which H-bombs and guided missiles give it now? These possibilities include no assurance that it would not be destroyed in turn; the odds are, instead, that such an attack would be suicidal.

Lippmann's Conclusion. It should be said that Union of the Free is not the solution that Walter Lippmann recommends from his talk with Mr. K. He agrees on the wisdom of "making sure that we do not lose the race of armaments." (Significantly, he does not talk in terms of winning it, but merely of not losing.) To avoid this, he does not prescribe that we seek any of the strength that proverbially lies in union—even though it would effectively win the race. He ignores the federal answer.

"For us," he writes, "the crucial problem of armaments is . . . how to keep the American and West European democracies ready and willing to support armaments without their becoming so obsessed with weapons that they have neither the means nor the understanding nor the will to meet the real Soviet challenge in Asia.

Counsel of Perfection. To solve this dilemma, Mr. Lippmann says: "We must learn to keep ourselves armed without working ourselves up into a frenzy of threats and of fear. This is not easy for a democracy to do, but it is necessary and, once the reason for it is understood by the leaders of American opinion, it can be done."

No democracy, of course, has ever succeeded in following this counsel of perfection. By its nature, democracy is almost certain to continue to put its

trust in generals who are better at dealing with politicians in peacetime than with enemies in war, and to find itself appallingly unprepared when war begins, despite heavy expenditure.

The only realistic safety for democracy lies in gaining enormous superiority in power by means that are only partly military—that are mainly moral, political, scientific, economic, industrial. By these means Federal Union gave the U. S. its great power—and can give the Atlantic Community in the same way immensely superior strength—without frenzy, and with plenty of means to spare to meet the Communist challenge in Asia, and with the creative will needed to meet it. If Federal Union, which democracies have already achieved and which all Americans agree is practical for Western Europe, is not practical for the Atlantic Community, what hope can there be of "not losing the race" by the Lippmann counsel of perfection?

Mr. K's Crucial Race. For Mr. K. the race that is "crucial" is not the one in armaments but the one in per capita production, by Mr. Lippmann's own report. Yet he offers no plan for not losing this race. He does not oppose the Federal Union horse. He must know that the present high productive power of the U. S. results primarily from the fact that federation permits a free movement of men, goods and money throughout the 48 States, and that per capita production would be further increased if this common market, currency and citizenship also included Canada, Britain, Western Europe. Mr. Lippmann, however, concerns himself instead only with meeting the challenge in Asia—though Mr. K. expects to win by winning the production race.

"The Communists are expanding in Asia," Mr. Lippmann writes, "because they are demonstrating a way, at present the only effective way, of raising quickly the power and the standard of living of a backward people. The only convincing answer to that must be a demonstration by the non-Communist nations that there is another and more humane way of overcoming the immemorial poverty and weakness of the Asian peoples.

"This demonstration can best be made in India, and there is little doubt in my mind that if we and our Western part-

ners could underwrite and assure the success of Indian development, it would make a world of difference.

To Help India Enough. We have no quarrel with this, and would agree that India is the "key country" for such a demonstration. Federation of the Atlantic community is no obstacle to Mr. Lippmann's dream; it is, instead, the only realistic way to assure both the means and the will to underwrite India in a *huge* enough way to achieve the desired result. Help for India can not be given on the necessary scale without the saving on arms and the stimulus to production that federation of the free brings. Economic improvement on a lesser scale will be drowned by the increase in population resulting both from this and from the decrease in the death rate through humane Western methods. Our humanitarians forget that the Russians and Chinese Communists made their per capita advance partly by decapitation—by measures that savagely increased the death rate. They forget, too, that India is in a more ardent climate—and that it is even harder to convert 400,000,000 Indians to birth control than to convert 400,000,000 Atlanticans to Federal Union.

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Mr. Lippmann may say that it is unrealistic to call for the federation of the Atlantic Community which would make possible the realization of his own dream. What, then, will History say of his own proposal? Walter Lippmann is so great a champion of freedom, and so much of a realist, that one can hope that he will go much further in time.

The Big Dulles "If." Before leaving for the NATO Ministerial Council in Paris, Secretary Dulles stated:

"We are convinced that IF [too bad the capitals aren't his] the free nations stay united . . . then hostile threats will be frustrated."

The fact is that the free nations will not stay united until they federate. Only thus can the big Dulles IF be removed. When will he—or the new Congress—begin the process of removing it by calling for the proposed convention to explore Atlantic Union? The only way that Mr. K. can hope to beat Freedom's royal flush is by our not betting on it in time.—CLARENCE STREIT